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A QUESTION OF INTENT: THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND UNILATERAL 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Elise Leclerc-Gagné* & Michael Byers†
While the question of the crime of aggression has prompted a num-
ber of publications and discussions pertaining to its preferable modalities of 
inclusion in the Rome Statute, surprisingly few scholars have considered 
contemporary events and debates on the use of force. Examining develop-
ments like the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention (UHI) is crucial 
for ensuring that amendments to the Rome Statute, meant to allow for the 
prosecution of aggression, are compatible with the current international 
environment. This paper engages the issue of UHI and argues for the need 
to include, in the conditions of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by 
the ICC, an exception for those engaged in a bona fide unilateral humanita-
rian intervention. 
INTRODUCTION
The criminal nature of aggression is now beyond question. The 
twentieth century has witnessed an increasing commitment to recognizing 
and condemning aggression, as exemplified by the renunciation of the re-
course to war by the State Parties to the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact1 and the 
1945 United Nations (U.N.) Charter, which includes among its primary pur-
poses suppressing “acts of aggression” and preventing the “threat or use of 
force” by Member States in their international relations.2 The criminal pros-
ecution of individuals for Crimes Against Peace,3 by the International Mili-
tary Tribunals (IMT) of Nuremberg and the Far East following World War 
 *  Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia.  
 †  Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British 
Columbia.  
1 Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [herinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. The Kellogg-Briand Pact refers to 
‘war’ and not to any specific type of territorial intervention or aggression. Id. The ambit of 
this wording is subject to debate. See, e.g., Richard L. Griffiths, International Law, the Crime 
of Aggression and the Ius ad Bellum, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 305–06 (2002). 
2 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
3 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945 (defining 
Crimes Against Peace as “namely, planning preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of 
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or par-
ticipation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing”). 
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II, and the adoption of a consensual definition of “aggression” by the U.N. 
General Assembly in 1974,4 constitute other examples of international ef-
forts to limit and outlaw aggression.  
Efforts to recognize aggression as an offense under international 
criminal law, which were made over half a century, bore fruit in 1996 when 
the crime of aggression was included in the Draft Code of Crimes adopted 
by the International Law Commission (ILC).5 The Draft Code served as a 
basis for the plenipotentiary negotiations in Rome where the European Un-
ion and approximately thirty countries of the Movement of the Non-Aligned 
Countries (NAC) made inclusion of the crime of aggression an absolute 
condition for their support of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).6 Given the sensitive nature of the crime of aggression, and 
particularly the prospect that high ranking officials of a State could face 
prosecution, the crime was included in the Statute but left undefined and 
without conditions of jurisdiction.7
Articles 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute prescribe a seven-year de-
lay before a State Party may propose an amendment,8 meaning that changes 
defining and providing conditions of jurisdiction for aggression will soon be 
permitted. However, exercising this potential requires reaching agreement 
on these matters in light of the events of the past decade. One such event 
was NATO’s intervention—“Operation Allied Force” (OAF)—in Kosovo, 
Serbia and Montenegro in 1999. Although the Kosovo War did not generate 
an uncontested right of unilateral humanitarian intervention (UHI),9 its 
unique character, and the fact that it was tolerated by many countries, intro-
duced new elements into discussions of the recourse to force in international 
affairs.10
In this article, we argue that an agreement on the definition and 
conditions of jurisdiction for aggression is needed, but that these provisions 
must include an exception for those engaged in a bona fide unilateral huma-
4 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(Dec. 14, 1974). 
5 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n., ch. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part. 2).
6 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Can aggression be deterred by law?, EQUIPO NIZKOR
[HUMAN RIGHTS], http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/doc/articulos/ferencz1.html (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2009). 
7 See Theodor Meron. Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 25 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1,3 (2001–2002). 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 121, 123, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
9 The authors are conscious that the exactness of the term unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention is subject to debate but it will be used in the present article given its preponderance 
in the literature studied. See e.g., Griffiths, supra note 1, at 338. 
10 Id. at 338–39.  
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nitarian intervention. The applicability and validity of this exception should 
include a mental element that is analogous—but not identical—to that set 
out in Article 30 of the Rome Statute.11 Our argument does not intend to 
reopen debates on the strengths and weaknesses of a possible right to UHI. 
Rather, we are merely suggesting a way in which the definition and condi-
tions of jurisdiction over aggression can accommodate circumstances where 
gross human rights violations do occur, the Security Council is not always 
prepared to act, and individual states or groups of states sometimes inter-
vene on what are—at least purportedly—humanitarian grounds. 
We follow a tripartite approach that begins with a brief explanation 
of the crime of aggression and why it should be included in the ICC Statute. 
We then outline the downfalls of prosecuting aggression in the absence of a 
UHI exception. Finally, we set out some conditions for invoking the excep-
tion that might usefully be included so as to preclude its abuse. 
I. THE PROSECUTION OF AGRESSION BY THE ICC
Numerous official declarations and publications have already ex-
plained why the International Criminal Court should be able to prosecute 
the crime of aggression. First, it is necessary to bring an end to the impunity 
of individuals who perpetrate aggression, which was characterized by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal as “the supreme international crime . . .  [which] con-
tains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”12 Second, a capacity 
to prosecute individuals for aggression should—when coupled with appro-
priate punishments—create a deterrent for would-be perpetrators.13 Finally, 
and in any event, a continued inability to prosecute aggression on the part of 
the first permanent International Criminal Court constitutes a backwards 
step in the development of international law, given the jurisprudence sup-
porting such prosecutions and the many, sometimes decades-old documents, 
treaties, and declarations outlawing and condemning aggression.14
Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute requires only that the eventual de-
finition and conditions of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression be 
“consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
11 Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 30. 
12 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression,
6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 552 (2007) (citing The Avalon Project: Judgment: 
The Nazi Regime in Germany, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp (last visited March 
5, 2009)). 
13 Jennifer Trahan. Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court Has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 439, 467 (2002). 
14 See Linda Jane Springrose, Aggression as a Core Crime in the Rome Statute Establish-
ing an International Criminal Court, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L. J. 151, 163 
(1999).
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tions.”15 Not surprisingly, State Parties, scholars and organizations have 
advanced a variety of different proposals. Given the specific purpose of our 
analysis and the already existing corpus of writings addressing this specific 
issue, only the most prominent proposals are considered here.16
In contrast to the other core crimes over which the ICC has jurisdic-
tion, an individual’s responsibility for perpetrating the crime of aggression 
must be determined in conjunction with a State act, namely the commission 
of an act of aggression. Any definition of the “crime of aggression” must 
therefore include both these distinct but related elements of individual re-
sponsibility and the state-committed act of aggression.17 But most of the 
definitional debate has, to date, concerned the state-committed act and not 
the question of individual responsibility. The latter is usually assumed—
following the precedent set by the Nuremberg Charter—on the basis of the 
individual’s position as a leader, organizer, instigator, or accomplice in the 
formulation or execution of the state-committed act.18
There are three main approaches: (1) a generic approach, based on 
customary international law, in which the act of aggression would be de-
fined generally; (2) an enumerative approach following the model of U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 in which those specific acts that could 
amount to aggression would be listed; and (3) a “Security Council ap-
proach” in which a specific, individual act of aggression would only be de-
fined and determined by the Security Council.19 The first approach, some-
times coupled with elements of the second approach as a means of illustra-
tion, has garnered the most support.20 Although various elements are still 
under discussion (e.g., the criminalization of threats or attempts to commit 
aggression, the adoption of a de minimis threshold, the terminology to be 
used),21 a definition based on customary international law is consistent with 
the approach taken for the other core crimes in the Rome Statute.22 It is pre-
ferable to the second approach, which potentially constrains the ongoing 
evolution of international criminal law, and greatly preferable to the third 
approach, since leaving the matter to ad hoc determinations by the Security 
Council risks arbitrary decision-making based on non-legal factors. Such a 
15 Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 5(2). 
16 For a thorough presentation of the different propositions, see Ferencz, supra note 12; 
Meron, supra note 7; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 497–521 (2002); Trahan, supra note 13.
17 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 309–310; Trahan, supra note 13, at 448. 
18 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 3, art. 6. 
19 Trahan, supra note 13, at 450–53. 
20 Trahan, supra note 13, at 456-459; Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 16; Meron, supra note 7 
at 8–15.  
21 Trahan, supra note 13, at 449. 
22 See Meron, supra note 7, at 8. 
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practice would not only be inconsistent with the conditions under which the 
other core crimes of the Statute are determined, it would also render it diffi-
cult for judicial bodies to use the Security Council determinations as a basis 
for appeals and the establishment of a lasting, guiding jurisprudence.23
Yet the Security Council must play something of a role, since the 
Rome Statute’s clauses regarding aggression must be made consistent with 
the U.N. Charter’s provisions—especially Article 39, which reads: “The 
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . .”24 While this provision could 
indicate an exclusive role for the Council in identifying acts of aggression, 
many authors and State Parties of the ICC have instead interpreted Article 
39 as giving the Council primary responsibility only.25 Four possibilities 
have been advanced. First, the Security Council could be the sole entity 
entitled to make determinations of the existence of an act of aggression.26
Second, in the case of inaction by the Security Council, the issue could be 
referred to the General Assembly.27 Similarly, third, in the case of inaction 
by the Security Council, the General Assembly could request a determina-
tion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).28 Lastly, in the case of 
inaction by the Security Council, the ICC could itself rule on the existence 
of an act of aggression.29 This determination could then be used in prosecu-
tions of individuals without being binding on States. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches 
have been widely analyzed. Suffice it to say that providing the possibility 
for determinations by other bodies—and especially courts—reduces the risk 
of politically-motivated determinations or, perhaps more likely, politically-
motivated blockings of determinations. An avenue around the Security 
Council and the veto power of its five permanent members could be an es-
sential precondition for ICC prosecutions of the crime of aggression.  
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF “CLASSIC” PROSECUTIONS FOR AGGRESSION
If the definition of the crime of aggression were based solely on the 
exceptions in the U.N. Charter and General Assembly resolution 3314, the 
ICC could initiate prosecutions whenever there was an established actus 
reus (in this case, an act of aggression), a mens rea confirming the intention 
23 See id. at 8. 
24 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
25 Ferencz, supra note 12, at 562; Meron, supra note 7, at 14; Nsereko, supra note 16, at 
511–13.
26 Ferencz, supra note 12, at 562. 
27 Id. at 562–63. 
28 Id. at 563. 
29 Id. at 563–64. 
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and knowledge of the State’s leaders to commit that actus reus, and a failure 
on the part of the State to exercise jurisdiction. This is not necessarily prob-
lematic since similar avenues to prosecutions are, in the broader context, 
relatively common. Moreover, the legitimacy of the body that determines 
aggression, the process of determination itself, and the capacity of determi-
nations to provide a forward-looking deterrent would all be enhanced by a 
clear definition.  
Nevertheless, a predicament arises when the Security Council fails 
to act in the face of gross human rights violations, either because of a politi-
cal stalemate or a widespread absence of political will. In such a situation, a 
unilateral humanitarian intervention may be the only option available for 
stopping mass atrocities, even if such interventions remain illegal under the 
U.N. Charter and customary international law.30 Given this predicament, the 
definition of aggression must preserve international stability by maintaining 
the existing rules on the use of force while, at the same time, allowing the 
occasional bona fide humanitarian intervention to take place. To reach the 
proper balance between maintaining existing rules on the use of force and 
allowing appropriate humanitarian intervention to take place, we build on 
the writings of Thomas Franck, Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers, ex-
tending their ideas on “exceptional illegality” into the sphere of internation-
al criminal law.31
Franck points to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in the former 
Yugoslavia as a prime example of how illegal state actions are sometimes 
excused or mitigated by the response of other states: 
Was the NATO action unlawful? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the 
prohibition in Article 2(4) cannot be said to have been repealed in practice 
by the system’s condoning of NATO’s resort to force without the requisite 
armed attack on it or prior Security Council authorization. Such a repeal is 
not supported by the members of the global system at this time. No, in the 
sense that no undesirable consequences followed on NATO’s technically 
illegal initiative because, in the circumstances as they were understood by 
the large majority of UN members, the illegal act produced a result more 
in keeping with the intent of the law (i.e. “more legitimate”)—and more 
moral—than would have ensued had no action been taken to prevent 
30 See Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Hu-
manitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824–28 (1999); Bruno Simma, NATO, the 
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). 
31 Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Interven-
tion, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 204 
(J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, 
Changing the Rules about Rule? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of 
International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS 177 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003). 
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another Balkan genocide. In other words, the unlawfulness of the act was 
mitigated, to the point of exoneration, in the circumstances in which it oc-
curred.32
And as Byers and Chesterman explain: 
States are not champing at the bit to intervene in support of human rights 
around the globe, prevented only by an intransigent Security Council and 
the absence of clear criteria to intervene without its authority. The prob-
lem, instead, is the absence of the will to act at all. In such circumstances, 
the primary goal must be to encourage states to see widespread and syste-
matic human rights violations as their concern too—as part of their “na-
tional interest”—and to act and act early to prevent them, stop them, or 
seek justice for them.33
In the absence of some kind of exception for unilateral humanita-
rian intervention, defining and providing ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression could deter those very few unilateral interventions that are, in 
fact, principally aimed at protecting fundamental human rights. Decision-
makers pondering such a benevolent operation would risk international 
criminal prosecution in addition to the possibility of diplomatic condemna-
tion, economic sanctions, or even a military response. 
Unilateral humanitarian interventions have been condemned as gen-
erally illegal by over 130 countries through unilateral or joint statements 
such as the Declaration of the South Summit of Havana and the final docu-
ment of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cartagena.34 Never-
theless, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was widely tolerated—even by 
those countries most opposed to the war—in the sense that no economic or 
military actions were taken against the intervening states.35 The juxtaposi-
tion of diplomatic condemnation and an absence of economic or military 
follow-up might seem inconsistent, though at one level it merely reflects 
substantial power disparities between the intervening and condemning 
states. In any event, international reaction to the Kosovo intervention raises 
the possibility that UHI could be regarded as legitimate (rather than legal) in 
certain limited and exceptional circumstances. By legitimacy, we mean “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desir-
able, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
32 Franck, supra note 311, at 226. 
33 Byers & Chesterman, supra note 311, at 202. 
34 Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
107, 108–12 (2006). 
35 Aaron Schwabach, Kosovo Virtual War and International Law, 15 LAW AND 
LITERATURE 1, 11 (2003).
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norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”36 In a world redefined since 1945 
by the U.N. Charter, its affirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights 
and in the dignity and worth of the human person,”37 and the subsequent 
human rights revolution, creating some space for purely humanitarian action 
within the rules and power politics governing the use of force is a noble—if 
risky and controversial—exercise. 
Much of the resistance to UHI is rooted in a concern that any such 
right could be used as a pretext for inappropriate interventions motivated by 
non-humanitarian goals.38 Although we believe the concern is well-
founded,39 we also believe it could be assuaged by the development of strict 
criteria for a UHI exception in the Rome Statute, as well as a reminder that 
the presence of such an exception does not amount to the general legaliza-
tion of UHI. An accused individual’s invocation of the exception would not 
shield the state from condemnation or enforcement action by the U.N., dip-
lomatic or economic countermeasures by other countries, or legal actions in 
the ICJ. It would simply maintain some space for “exceptional illegality”—
a concept that seeks to augment efforts to preserve the peace and prevent 
mass atrocities while maintaining traditional rules and institutions.40
III. THE UHI EXCEPTION
Given the individual basis on which the UHI exception should be 
granted and the bona fide motivation behind the intervention that should be 
demonstrated,  the criteria for having recourse to this exception should in-
clude a mental component analogous to the one set out in Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute: 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
36 IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL 30 (2007). 
37 U.N. Charter preamble. 
38 Goodman, supra note 344, at 107–08 (citing Franck, supra note 311, at 229–31). 
39 See Simon Chesterman & Michael Byers, Has US power destroyed the UN?, LONDON 
REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 29, 1999; The credibility of this fear of interventions with ulterior 
motives in case of legalization of a right to UHI is contested by Ryan Goodman who argues 
that the presence of a legal right to UHI would instead discourage such pretext wars. See
Ryan Goodman, supra note 344, at 107–41. 
40 While some may claim that only legal matters should have bearing—given the legal 
nature of the ICC— we believe that some account should be taken of the deeply political and 
moral origins of the law. 
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(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that con-
sequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. 
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.41
Of course, the test in Article 30 concerns whether a person intends 
to engage in the particular, proscribed action. The test we are proposing is 
different. Rather than concerning intent, it asks whether the person’s prin-
cipal motivation for deciding to use force is a genuine humanitarian desire 
to prevent gross human rights violations. If the ICC determines that this 
particular mental element existed, individual criminal responsibility for ag-
gression would not be assigned. 
Given the exceptional nature of our proposed exemption, invoking 
the UHI exception would be an affirmative defense. The prosecution would 
retain the burden of proof to establish that the defendant committed the 
crime of aggression; at that point, if the defendant wished to invoke the ex-
ception, it would be up to him to establish the facts discharging criminal 
responsibility. And so, while Article 66(2) of the Rome Statute states “the 
onus is on the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused,” consistent with 
the presumption of innocence, the proposed exception would come in after 
that point—and  expunge the criminal nature of an otherwise illegal act of 
aggression.42 This arrangement is in line with the maxim necessitas proban-
di incumbit ei qui agit. As with the defense of necessity, it is the defendant 
wishing to be discharged of criminal responsibility who at the second 
stage—and that stage only—carries the evidentiary burden. 
We recommend that the evaluation of the mental element be made 
with regard to the individual leaders of the acting states, since the acting 
states are answerable before the ICC for the alleged crime. We do not be-
lieve the mens rea test should be applied to the state or coalition of states 
involved, or to the collective leadership of those countries. Rather, it is ne-
cessary to discern the mental element of each individual accused, as part of 
their personal criminal responsibility. And it is possible that different indi-
viduals leading the same intervention could have different principal motiva-
tions. For example, the leader of one State could be principally motivated 
by a desire to stop genocide, while another leader within the same coalition 
could be principally motivated by geopolitical or natural resource-related 
concerns. That said, as part of his or her discretion, the prosecutor may de-
41 Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 30. 
42 Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 66(2). 
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cide that evidence of a substantial humanitarian motive on the part of a coa-
lition is sufficient reason not to pursue any the leaders involved. 
An accused seeking to prove humanitarian intent could rely on var-
ious kinds of evidence, including documents related to the planning of the 
operation, diplomatic communications with coalition partners, special rules 
of engagement designed to avoid civilian casualties, and even decisions 
taken after military operations ceased. Did the accused, for instance, order 
that forces be withdrawn as quickly as possible? Or did he keep those forces 
in place to secure long-term military bases or a favourable resource-
exploitation regime? Assessing the mental element behind an intervention 
requires an in-depth examination of events, decisions, and actions—on the 
part of the individual accused, his government, and the leaders and govern-
ments of allied states. The threshold for the UHI exception will necessarily 
be high, and again, the burden of proof rests with the accused individual. 
The accused will have to establish that he knew gross human rights 
violations were taking place, for it would be impossible to have humanita-
rian intent in the absence of such knowledge. Also, the UHI exception 
should only be available with respect to certain, particular severe human 
rights violations. Christine Chinkin, for one, proposes allowing UHI for 
crimes against humanity only.43 And finally, the accused will have to dem-
onstrate a well-founded belief that the U.N. Security Council was unable or 
unwilling to respond to the crisis—and not because of his own actions or 
inactions. Otherwise, political leaders would be able to order military inter-
ventions whenever they saw fit, thus undermining the sovereignty of target 
states and destabilizing the international system. This is precisely the con-
cern voiced by many opponents of UHI. Introducing a mental element with 
a high factual threshold helps alleviate this concern, while according some 
space for the concept of “exceptional illegality” as applied to unilateral, 
bona fide efforts to protect the most fundamental human rights.  
Introducing a UHI exception that involves a mental element is con-
sistent with established international criminal law—including Article 30 of 
the Rome Statute—which recognizes that the intent to commit a crime (such 
as, in this instance, aggression) should not be confounded with different 
intentions (such as, in this instance, the intent to save thousands of innocent 
lives). Just as importantly, such an exception does not detract from other 
provisions of the Statute, nor indeed the essence and purpose of that instru-
ment. The primary responsibility of the Security Council with regards to 
international peace and security remains intact.  
Indeed, introducing a nuanced, tightly constrained UHI exception 
could enhance the legitimacy and mutual compatibility of both the Security 
43 Christine Chinkin, The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) under International Law, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 920, 920–21 (2000). 
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Council and the ICC. It would, among other things, help to ensure that un-
ilateral inventions do not take place with respect to lesser human rights vi-
olations, or on the basis of concocted justifications. The test we propose, 
which examines both the “subjective” element of a leadership’s intent and 
their more “objective” knowledge of the concurrent existence of gross hu-
man rights violations and international inaction, would hardly generate a 
rush toward greater unilateralism. Nor would it undermine efforts to have 
the ICC prosecute the crime of aggression, since successful invocations of 
the UHI exception are likely to be rare. 
The UHI exception would simply recognize that violations of inter-
national law might very occasionally be excused—or their punishments 
mitigated—on the basis of “exceptional illegality.” In other words, the in-
ternational community may decide not to punish the perpetrators of a par-
ticular intervention because their motivations were genuinely humanitarian. 
And it might decide this without wishing to cause, or even contemplate, any 
change in the rules. 
CONCLUSION
An agreement on the definition and conditions of ICC jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression is needed. This agreement, which must be 
reached amongst the States Parties to the Rome Statute, will help to end the 
culture of impunity that currently benefits those who perpetuate aggression. 
However, crafting these amendments requires more than a melding of cus-
tomary international law and U.N. declarations. The definition and condi-
tions of jurisdiction must be tailored to the present international environ-
ment in which the United Nations—and the U.N. Charter’s provisions on 
the recourse to force—have sometimes proven inadequate in situations of 
gross human rights violations. Very occasionally, a UHI may constitute the 
only means available to stop the atrocities, and a country or countries capa-
ble of acting may have the necessary political will. If the intervention is 
truly motivated by humanitarian concerns and not exploited for other pur-
poses, the international community might then excuse the violation of inter-
national law by choosing not to apply countermeasures. In light of the pos-
sibility of this kind of “exceptional illegality,” any amendments to the Rome 
Statute’s provisions concerning the crime of aggression should contain an 
exception that provides accused individuals with the opportunity of proving 
that their personal decision-making (i.e., the actions for which they have 
been charged) was principally motivated by humanitarian concerns, and that 
no other alternatives existed for stopping the atrocities. 
Again, the exception would not prevent other countries from choos-
ing, individually or collectively, to punish the violation of international law 
diplomatically, economically or even militarily. It would simply shield from 
prosecution those political leaders who, when faced with gross human rights 
violations and a Security Council that is unable or unwilling to act, genuine-
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ly decide to do the morally “right” thing and violate the U.N. Charter. In 
doing so, it would avoid the perverse situation where an individual could be 
prosecuted in the ICC for a decision the international community, at the 
level of inter-state relations, had chosen to overlook or otherwise excuse. 
And it would be entirely consistent with the intent and spirit of the Rome 
Statute which, at root, is aimed at preventing and punishing the very same 
gross human rights violations as a bona fide unilateral humanitarian inven-
tion. 
